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Introduction
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 1 countries have emerged as one of the most financially liquid regions in the world on account of the unprecedented economic boom triggered by high oil prices during the last decade. The current account balance of the GCCs went up from US$32 billion in 2001 to US$256 billion in 2008, compared to the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 2 whose current account rose from US$19 billion to US$184 billion over the same period. Figure 1 , adapted from Peeters (2011) , illustrates the composition of gross flows of the GCC's current and capital account over this period. As Figure 1 shows, total portfolio investment outflows outstripped total portfolio inflows, reflecting the accumulation of hydrocarbon revenues by the GCC countries. Since 2003, government current spending has risen cumulatively by 58%, mainly reflecting rising wages and subsidies (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2008) . A policy mix of an expansionary fiscal stance and an easy monetary stance (imported via fixed exchange rates) resulted in growing economic deficits to be monetized by the central banks.
The incidence of a liquidity surplus, in its broader sense, has been a common phenomenon observed across the GCC region during oil-price booms. The GCC's high surplus led to strong domestic aggregate demand. Over a span of six years, the average annual growth in private consumption jumped from 8% in 2003 to over 24% in 2008, with Saudi Arabia exhibiting a nearly five-fold increase, and Oman and Qatar both presenting a four-fold increase. Gross capital formation increased from about 35% of the non-oil GDP in 2003 to about 48% in 2007 (IMF, 2008 . Investments were broad-based in all countries except the UAE, where they were more concentrated in construction (Khamis et al., 2010) . Robust aggregate demand (including exports) led to strong economic growth: over the [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] period, GCC countries grew at an annual average real rate of 7%. This impressive economic performance has been accompanied by a general increase in consumer prices. Average headline inflation jumped from 1.5% in 2003 to 10.6% in 2008, with considerable variation in the level and volatility of in inflation rates across the six countries. 3 Being no exception within the GCC, Qatar has witnessed a gradual accumulation of net capital inflows since mid-2000 owing to hydrocarbon revenues, geo-political and geo-economic developments. In particular, accumulation of foreign reserves on the asset side of the Qatar Central Bank's (QCB's) balance sheet can be traced back to the fraction of hydrocarbon revenues injected into the domestic economy via (i) the government budget; (ii) net private sector's foreign borrowing; (iii) foreign direct investment (encompassing the cash portion of hydrocarbon-related investment and real estate purchase); and (iv) net short-term foreign portfolio investments (including stocks, bonds, bank deposits, etc.). Moreover, Qatar witnessed a further remarkable surge in foreign currency inflows beginning in late 2007, due to a speculative revaluation attack on the Qatari Riyal (QR). Such net inflows resulted in surges in the economic deficit 4 that the QCB had to monetize. This, in turn, resulted in the accumulation of abundant QR liquidity on the liabilities side of the central bank's balance sheet. This was not sterilized because, unlike some GCC central banks, QCB lacked a number of standard liquidity management tools that are commonly used to drain liquidity off the interbank market. Without effective liquidity management instruments, the imported Federal Reserve (hereafter Fed) easy monetary policy stance became over effective during the pre-crisis period.
This was a serious concern for QCB as the interest rate channel of the monetary transmission mechanism was weakened, and because the potential pass-through of the interbank liquidity surplus to the general consumer price level. Going beyond acknowledging the threat of rising inflation and the subsequent appreciation of the QR real exchange rate, an accumulation of liquidity surplus in the interbank money market posed serious threats to the stability of the financial system, including risks posed by credit and asset prices booms, and sectoral entities' balance sheet vulnerabilities. From a policy perspective, identifying the various channels of liquidity surplus is vital.
The present paper endeavors to evaluate the QCB's experience in managing liquidity in the interbank market under conditions of a structural primary liquidity surplus (PLS) and to provide relevant policy recommendations. Although this paper deals with the experience of Qatar, our analysis may be appropriate for other GCC economies. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the concepts of primary liquidity and structural PLS, and discusses several sources of primary liquidity in the context of the Qatari economy. Section 3 presents important corollaries of the structural liquidity surplus in Qatar. Section 4 focuses on QCB's primary liquidity management within the pre-crisis QCB monetary policy framework.
In Section 5, we discuss significant post-crisis changes in the QCB monetary policy framework, QCB's monetary policy conduct and the conduct of its liquidity policy. Section 6 attempts to evaluate QCB's pre-and post-crisis experiences. Section 7 concludes the paper and presents some policy recommendations.
Primary Liquidity Surplus

5
The phrase "liquidity" is used in practical central banking in the context of a wide range of measures of the quantity of money (encompassing the whole spectrum of monetary aggregates).
Yet, in this paper, we focus on the narrowest liquidity concept most relevant for day-to-day central banking commonly known as "interbank liquidity", "money market liquidity", "QR liquidity", or "primary liquidity." Primary liquidity encompasses the entirety of free reserves held -voluntarily and involuntarily -by the depository institutions in their current deposit (settlement) accounts at the central bank. Voluntarily held free reserves are "excess reserves", conventionally defined as the precautionary demand for banks' reserves, 6 while involuntarily held free reserves in excess of precautionary balances are a primary liquidity surplus. Where and when the cash flows into the money market exceed the cash flows drained into the central bank, the phenomenon of PLS occurs. If such a phenomenon persists for extended period, we have the phenomenon of "structural" PLS. The same process works in reverse for a structural primary liquidity shortage.
Sources of PLS
Sources of PLS in Qatar can be classified in two categories typically dubbed "pull" and "push" factors. Pull factors operate via the traditional balance of payment transmission mechanism (leading to higher government spending financed by converting foreign currency into QR through the local banking sector) attracting capital inflows as a result of positive changes in the domestic economic conditions. These include political stability, robust economic growth, asset price increases, etc. In contrast, push factors include higher export revenues causing a current account surplus, as well as investment income inflows via the income account of the balance of payments.
5 This section draws heavily on Elsamadisy (2010a,b) . 6 Since these deposits are held at the discretion of the banks, they are known as "free" or "excess" reserves. See Bindseil et al. (2006) for an illustration of the role of excess reserves in the implementation of monetary policy in settlement accounts in the context of the European Central Bank.
Push factors operate via the budgetary transmission mechanism. Thus, sources of PLS include:
(i) a current account surplus; (ii) private capital account flows; (iii) low policy interest rates; and (iv) a speculative revaluation attack on the QR.
Current Account Surplus
Qatar has been running current account surpluses since 1999. Yet, the size of the current account surplus increased noticeably during 2003-2008, thanks to the sustained increase in international oil prices. This surplus rose from about $6 billion (25% of GDP) in 2003 to $34.57 billion (31% of GDP) by 2008. 7 Oil and gas are priced, invoiced and paid for in US dollars directly to the state. As such, current account surpluses do not automatically generate liquidity in the domestic banking system. Rather, it is the utilization of this surplus to finance public spending via the budgetary transmission mechanism 8 that results in a downward shift in the supply of US dollars in the domestic foreign exchange market, forcing on-demand QCB purchases of dollars.
This results in foreign exchange assets being injected on the assets side, and free reserves on the liabilities side of the central bank's balance sheet, thus accumulating free reserves in the banking system.
Private Capital Account Flows
Net inflows through the capital and financial accounts of the private sector's balance of payments constituted a significant source of QCB's foreign reserves. Foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investments (including financial FDI), reluctance of private capital surpluses to outflow and repatriation of private overseas investments (due to the changes in the geo-political and geo-economic environments in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks) were the most important determinants of net capital inflow during the pre-crisis period. 8 In financing public spending programs, the government sells a portion of its dollar proceeds to the commercial banks in exchange for QR and thus, ceteris paribus, generates a downward shift in the US dollar supply in the domestic market for foreign exchange. When the government's dollar sales exceed the total quantity of foreign currency necessary to finance the private sector's net commodity imports, net capital exports, net income transfers and expatriate remittances, the residual amount finds its way to the assets side of the central bank's balance sheet via on-demand purchases of US dollars. This residual is nothing but the economic deficit that the QCB has to monetize and therefore results in an injection of free reserves on the liabilities side of the central bank's balance sheet, i.e., an injection of primary liquidity in the interbank money market (e.g., Elsamadisy, 2003a) . improvements in the business environment. 9 These inflows were bolstered by rising oil prices that formed the basis for robust economic growth (UNCTAD, 2009).
After September 11, 2001, many Arab investors investing in Western countries faced diplomatic risk "arising from Western countries' sensitiveness about terrorism and the potential for unexpected deterioration in relations between Arab and Western countries" (Habibi, 2008, p. 14) . Growing fears of confiscation or asset-freezing by host governments led small-and mediumsized GCC private investors to withdraw their funds from Western countries in favor of more politically "safe" investment opportunities. In addition to the fear of litigation and asset freezing, after 9/11, obtaining a US travel visa has become more difficult for Arab businessmen owing to security concerns (Habibi, 2008) . In the meantime, political stability and the resilient domestic economy presented strong "pull factors" attracting the Qatari and non-Qatari (particularly from within the GCC) private capital surpluses invested in the West to head back home.
In a nutshell, rising capital inflows were, ceteris paribus, a liquidity-creating factor working through the conventional balance of payments transmission mechanism. This resulted in a further downward shift in the supply of the US dollar in the domestic foreign exchange market, forcing further on-demand central bank purchases of the dollar that resulted in an injection of foreign exchange assets on the assets side, and free QR reserves on the liabilities side of the central bank's balance sheet, thus generating primary liquidity.
Low Policy Interest Rates
The then prevailing global environment of low policy interest rates, owing to the stimulating monetary policy stance adopted by major central banks, resulted in easing global financial markets. These policies triggered capital flows looking for higher yield into emerging market economies, particularly those with fixed exchange rate arrangements (where there is little or no exchange rate risk). Meanwhile, low interest rates abroad reduced liquidity leakage out of domestic economies. In Qatar, despite the low policy rates due to the QR peg, net foreign currency inflows generated upward pressure on the home currency and forced home currency sales by the central bank. Foreign exchange assets were thus injected on the assets side and free reserves on the liabilities side of its balance sheet, accumulating primary liquidity in the banking system.
A Speculative Revaluation Attack on the QR
Speculative revaluation attacks are triggered when and where a home currency is considerably undervalued. Under a fixed exchange rate, speculative foreign exchange assets accumulate at the central bank and speculative home currency funds accumulate in the banking system, leading to the accumulation of free reserves in the banks' current deposits accounts at the central bank, which, therefore, augment an existing PLS or create one. By October 2007, short-term speculative funds had started accumulating in the banking system, with the conjecture that a weakening US dollar and low US interest rates might force the Qatari authorities to revalue the QR. Economic arguments for a revaluation were growing stronger as Qatar's average annual rate of inflation (15%) helped to accelerate the real effective exchange rate appreciation, while the nominal effective exchange rate was heading downward due to the weakening dollar 
Corollaries of Structural PLS
Structural PLS in the interbank market in the years before the global financial crisis had serious repercussions for the economy of Qatar, which faces a serious problems of limited absorptive capacity that cannot be addressed in the short-run. Below we discuss some corollaries of the structural PLS documented in Qatar during the pre-crisis period.
The Central Bank was no Longer a Price Setter
Since a central bank is the monopoly supplier of the home currency, one undesirable implication of a structural PLS is the loss of the central bank's status as a price (marginal cost) setter in the interbank market. To appreciate this point, consider the converse condition of a liquidity shortage in the banking sector where a central bank engages in credit transactions with the depository institutions. Being a net creditor to the banking sector, the central bank acts as a 10 Potential liquidity is defined as the balance of free reserves plus the Qatar Money Market Rate Mechanism's (QMR's) net deposits balance. The QMR is a double-featured QCB standing facility where participating banks can obtain loans from and place deposits with the QCB at pre-specified rates for maturity ranging from 1 to 30 days. 
Weakening the Interest Rate Channel of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism
When there is a structural shortage of liquidity in the interbank market, changes in the central bank policy rates are fully and rapidly reflected in changes in interbank rates (hence the retail interest rates). Conversely, a structural PLS has the potential to disrupt this interest rate channel, so it breaks down or become weak. The central bank practically loses its ability to influence the money market rates. The depository institutions may lend their surplus reserves to the central bank -or otherwise -at their discretion. Consequently, the central bank's ability to transmit its preferred interest rate into the market is weakened. Indeed, the interbank rates will tend towards zero under a massive structural PLS. interbank interest rates can potentially fall close to zero. The implication is that banks would make riskier loans and/or move into foreign currencies in a search for yield, or they may cease to accept interest-bearing customer deposits. The right panel of Figure 2 shows that QIBOR had fallen sharply below the federal funds rate (FFR) and/or the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR), during the same period. Equally, QCB's monetary policy was subordinated to its exchange rate policy. Thus, QCB's precrisis monetary policy framework was a fixed exchange rate target subject to QR convertibility, implying interest rate parity between the QR and the USD. As such, maintaining equilibrium in the local USD market at parity was the primary objective of the QCB's monetary policy.
Acceleration in Money and Credit Growth
Aspects other than the exchange rate are of ensuring priority in relation to monetary policy. 14 Sustaining the peg credibility was imperative for anchoring domestic inflation expectations.
QCB's interest rates framework comprised three policy rates: the QCB Lending Rate (QCBLR), the QCBDR and the QCB Repurchase Agreement (Repo) Rate (QCBRR). Both the QCBLR and QCBDR are overnight rates. Longer maturity rates were monotonically in-12 These averages, however, hide rather large variations in time. For example, after consecutive negative growth rates over [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] , the public sector real credit growth jumped to 95% in 2007 before dropping to 55% in 2008.
13 However, domestic inflation in Qatar was also affected by other external and internal factors. On the external front, soaring global commodity prices and a weakening US dollar adversely impacted Qatar's import bills. On the domestic front, a near doubling of the population within a very short span of time (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) resulted in a huge pressure on the domestic supply of residential housing units, causing the inflation of house rents to reach its highest level in 2007 at 29.44%. Rising aggregate demand also put pressure on other non-rent domestic items. Over the 2003-2008 period, nontradable inflation more than tripled compared to tradable inflation. Consequently, headline inflation rose from a model 2.30% in 2003 to nearly 12% in 2006 before reaching its highest level 15.25% in 2008 (see Figure 3c) . As a result of higher inflation, Qatar's effective exchange rate appreciated over the [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] , as depicted in Figure 3d . See Basher and Elsamadisy (2012) for an empirical analysis on the sources of inflation in GCC countries.
14 The double constraint of institutionalized QR convertibility and the monetary strategy of exchange rate targeting have imposed stringent restrictions on the scope and effectiveness of QCB's monetary policy.
creasing linear functions of the respective policy rate, subject to formal bank-by-bank ceilings determined by the QCB.
In managing the QR exchange rate, the QCB operated with two instruments: QCB policy interest rates and on-demand exchange market interventions. Whether to intervene or to vary the policy rate are technically separate decisions, since they may be implemented independently.
However, they may be seen, to some extent, as substitutes in relation to the QR exchange rate, depending on the magnitude and sustainability of capital flows, particularly financial flows. In the short-term, QCB will only use interventions in defending the peg. Isolated interventions would take place primarily to alleviate temporary pressures in the market. In the long run, QCB keeps the QR stable vis-à-vis the USD by adjusting its policy rates. Having faith in the impossible trinity and the predominance of the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP), QCB was always keen to shadow the Fed's policy rate closely whenever the market is stable; otherwise it would independently adjust its policy rate. This rendered the spread between QCB's policy rate and the Fed's policy rate a key to the QCB's monetary and exchange rate management.
QCB's Pre-Crisis Liquidity Policy Framework
Within QCB's pre-crisis monetary framework, QCB's liquidity policy was drawn and conducted with the view to manage the interday and the intraday between April 2002 and June 2006 liquidity in the interbank money market in a way to steer the shorter-term (overnight) money market interest rates to keep them as close as possible to the policy rate (the shadow of the Fed policy rate) and hence sustain the exchange rate parity. The key to the QCB liquidity policy is the aggregate net balance of the banks' free reserves account (current deposits or settlement accounts) at the opening time of the Qatar Payment System. The opening balance of this account is dubbed "primary liquidity," "interbank liquidity," "money market liquidity," or "QR liquidity" (c/f Section 2) at the start of the monetary policy day.
Besides a bounded conventional daylight overdraft facility, QCB's pre-crisis liquidity policy framework comprised a narrow set of liquidity management tools: (a) the required reserves ratio (RRR); (b) collateralized loans (repurchase agreements) with two weeks or with a one-month maturity; (c) a hybrid daylight set of central bank standing facilities dubbed the "Qatar Money Market Rate Mechanism" (QMR; the QMR was amended more than once); (d) a QCB end-day standard refinancing standing facility; and (e) QCB certificates of deposits (CDs), which were first launched in March 2008. Starting on 26 January 2008, QMR encompassed a multi-maturity refinance standing facility (up to 30 days) and a multi-maturity deposit standing facility (up to 30 days). As mentioned earlier, QCB's interest rates framework comprised three policy rates: the QCBLR, the QCBDR and the QCBRR.
Even though QCB has always endeavored to operate a money market corridor system, a floor system has been the de facto system that QCB actually operated and the QCBDR has been the de facto major policy rate. Changes in this rate manifest shifts in the orientation of monetary policy: reductions signal easing and rises indicate tightening of QCB's (actually the Fed's) policy stance. Consistently, the QCB liquidity policy framework was focused on steering the interbank overnight interest rate to keep it as close as possible to the QCB policy rate. However, QCB's pre-crisis arsenal contained only a few liquidity management instruments (particularly liquidity drainage), thus incapacitating QCB's liquidity management. Several standard monetary instruments were not available at the disposal of QCB, such as:
• Only medium-and long-term government bonds (not treasury bills) were issued to commercial banks during the pre-crisis era, with trading restricted among banks. Moreover, most bonds were issued at higher than market interest rates, thus encouraging commercial banks to buy and hold the securities. Absent a secondary market for public debt securities, open market operations (OMOs) had not been a viable instrument for QCB. 15
• Likewise, absent deep QR forward market, foreign exchange swaps did not present an effective alternative. Although, in the absence of any exchange rate risk for the QR against the US dollar, foreign exchange swaps could be easily computed between the central bank and commercial banks just like any other day-to-day transaction between the two parties, but this was not an alternative for the QCB. Selling US dollars (the QCB intervention currency) would have intensified the downward pressure on the US dollar in the Doha exchange market, while purchases of US dollar would have aggravated the structural liquidity surplus situation in the interbank market.
• Furthermore, absent effective coordination between QCB and the general government • Imposition of capital controls was never a (politically) viable alternative for the QCB.
QCB's Pre-Crisis Liquidity Management
Only required reserves, QCB hybrid standing facilities and the collateralized loans were utilized after the beginning of the last decade (more precisely, the QMR mechanism was initiated in late April 2002). QCB certificates of deposits were initiated in March 2008, only six months before the blowup of the global financial crisis, and were terminated in May 2011, whence QCB started to issue treasury bills (on behalf of the MOEF) with the same maturity structure.
1. Reserve Requirements: QCB has adopted a required reserves regime that neither allows an averaging scheme nor remunerates the reserves (so the maintenance period is one day). A bank that does not meet its required reserves is heavily penalized. The 2. QCB Certificates of Deposits: Mindful of the lack of government securities for the purposes of monetary operations, the QCB opted to issue and auction its own securities.
16 Public sector deposits account for over 30% of the banking system's deposit base in Qatar. The use of this method has been highly effective in Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Thailand (e.g., Lee, 1997) . In some countries, central banks have been given some control of government deposits by law. The Bank of Canada, for example, can transfer government deposits from commercial banks to itself, and vice versa (Cottarelli, 1993) .
17 See, for example, Ministry of Finance (2012).
However, the QCB's auctioning of its CDs among banks was performed on irregular basis, signaling an absence of short-to medium-term liquidity planning by QCB. Moreover, these securities had short-term maturities (up to 12 months) and offered rather high rates compared to securities with similar maturity structures by the Central Bank of Bahrain.
As mentioned earlier, QCB ceased to issue its CDs once the MOEF started issuing treasury bills in May 2011.
3. Repos: These are conducted in domestic government securities at the initiative of the commercial banks. The QCBRR is known in advance and provides a means for longermaturity sources of funds.
4. The QMR: This is a monetary instrument through which local banks are allowed to deposit and borrow from the QCB with a pre-specified interest rate. Prior to December 2008, there was an individual bank-by-bank ceiling on the total amount of deposit from the QCB via the QMR mechanism (see Box 1).
The Crisis Period
To reiterate, the policy stance of the Fed (and other major central banks) during the pre-crisis era had been primarily expansionary in response to periods of heightened volatility in the aftermath of 9/11. The events that followed -the anthrax attacks, and the invasion of Afghanistan 
Box 1. The QMR Mechanism
The QMR is a set of QCB's nonstandard standing facilities, used to absorb/inject primary liquidity off/into the banking system as needed. It is nonstandard because unlike clearing-time standard overnight standing facilities, the QMR facilities, at present, operate for a limited daylight hours (from 09:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m.) on monetary policy days. The QMR facilities also differ from the standard facilities in that they are multimaturity facilities ranging from 1 to 30 days, during which the QMR deposits/loans are restricted from use before maturity. The deposit facility is designed to 'drain' surplus liquidity and not intended to 'absorb' banks' excess reserves by the end of a monetary policy day.
In the pre-crisis period, individual banks were subject to a deposit 'ceiling' which was determined by the balance of the bank's required reserved account on the 15th of the previous calendar month. Hence, a bank's credit ceiling is a monotonic increasing function of its QMR deposits with a minimum equal to its QMR deposits' ceiling. As can be seen from Figure 2 (left panel), the ceiling was effective during the pre-crisis era, as the QIBOR was well below the QCB deposit rate, mainly because marginal interest rate on deposits was zero. The ceiling was removed in the last week of December 2008, causing the marginal rates on deposits to increase to the level of QCB's deposit rate.
Consequently, surplus funds migrated from the banks' free reserve accounts into banks' QMR deposit accounts, resulting in the convergence of QIBOR to QCB deposit rate (see Figure 2) . The ceiling was reinstalled in mid-January 2011; however, beginning mid-2011, the ceiling was not effective in the sense that the banks' deposits were lower than the ceiling amount 
Discussion
This section attempts to evaluate QCB's monetary policy across the mid-September 2008 global financial meltdown. But first, recalling some major aspects of the monetary policies of some major central banks, it is worth noting that the monetary counterrevolution of the early 1980s marked the return to assigning a heavy weight to price stability in the process of monetary policy making. Since then, the policy rate levels continued to structurally decline in the major advanced economies. While this was driven by an asymmetric exchange rate policy in Japan (Danne and Schnabl, 2008) , it was driven by an asymmetric monetary policy response towards developments in the stock markets (Hoffmann, 2012) . Figure 5 shows that the Fed's monetary policy tended to respond strongly to the bear markets but not as strongly to the bull markets (Hoffmann, 2009) . It was Alan Greenspan who developed a central banking practice keen to stabilize financial markets in time of crisis but be inactive during boom times, in line with the Jackson Hall Consensus. 20 Such a practice prevailed during the pre-crisis era, during which QCB strictly shadowed the Fed's policy interest rate. We opt to employ the Austrian monetary overinvestment theories (Wicksell 1898; von Mises 1912; von Hayek 1929 von Hayek , 1935 to interpret the policy actions of the Fed and the QCB during the pre-and post-crisis periods.
Although the monetary overinvestment theories were originally introduced to model the real 20 According to the so-called "Jackson Hall Consensus", the US central bankers have determined that central banks have no sufficient information to recognize and forestall stock market bubbles, but should intervene in times of financial turmoil (Blinder and Reis, 2005) . business cycles, they can be utilized as a framework to analyze monetary policies and to identify policy mistakes committed by central banks. We are therefore keen to use them as a framework for our analysis attempting to explain the developments in the QR liquidity surplus in the Qatari interbank market. Four interest rate concepts are identified within the framework of the Austrian monetary overinvestment theories: (1) the "internal interest rate" that reflects the expected rate of return on an investment; (2) the "credit market interest rate" charged by the private financial (banking) sector on credit provided to private enterprises; (3) the "central bank policy interest rate" set by the central bank; and (4) Wicksell's (1898) theoretical concept of the "natural interest rate" that balances supply (savings) and demand (investment) in the domestic capital market. The "natural interest rate" is not known to the policy makers. Accordingly, only when the credit market interest rate is equal to the central bank policy interest rate and both are equal to the natural interest rate, will savings and investment decisions be in equilibrium in an economy.
A deviation from the (unknown) natural interest rate would result in a monetary policy mistake. Two types of monetary policy mistakes can be identified (Hoffmann and Schnabl, 2011) . A Type I monetary policy mistake is committed where and when the central bank keeps the policy rate below the natural interest rate for too long during the upswing of an economic cycle, triggering an overinvestment boom that leads to crisis and recession. A Type II monetary policy mistake is committed where and when the central bank keeps the policy rate above the natural interest rate for too long during the downturn of an economic cycle, thereby aggravating the recession. The policy implication is that the central bank should keep its policy rate as close as possible to the (unknown) natural interest rate in order to smooth economic cycles. Since the natural interest rate remains a theoretical concept unknown to the central bank, it is the task of the central bank to gain sufficient information to approximate the natural interest rate (in this spirit, Taylor's (1993) rule is an example).
During the pre-crisis period, the Fed (under Alan Greenspan) started cutting its policy rate in January 2001 -in the aftermath of the burst of the dotcom bubble -from 6.5% over In the meantime, the Fed started launching its unconventional Credit Easing policy in the form of a series of non-standard refinancing facilities, followed by "Large-scale Asset Purchases I" or 21 For example, the People's Bank of China raised its reserve requirements six times in 2010 but moved its policy interest rate only once (Kashyap and Stein, 2012) .
22 Such funds could have made it feasible to expand QCB's OMOs via selling treasury-like bonds and bills to the banks and the public.
23 See, http://www.cbb.gov.bh/page-p-issuance of govt securities.htm. 24 For example, when the domestic inflation rate is significantly and persistently higher than in trading partner countries, the problem can be dealt with by a pre-emptive move by the central bank towards an upward adjustment in the exchange rate. Similar actions can be used if the inflow of "hot money" seeks short-term profits. This was an ultra-easy monetary stance. While all other GCC central banks cut their policy rates following the Fed after the collapse of Lyman Brothers, QCB -for the first time since it was established -decided not to follow. All three QCB policy rates were frozen: the QCBDR at 2%, the QCBLR at 5.50% and the QCBRR at 5.55%. That was a deliberate Type II monetary policy mistake, aimed at deflating the economy (by reinforcing the local impact of the global financial crisis) so that the economy reaches the next (anticipated) self-triggered boom at low base inflation rates. Later on, it was proved that QCB had acted promptly and capably. while the banking and financial stability was preserved. It is thus concluded that breaking up with the Fed, adopting a dual mandated monetary policy framework, separating monetary policy from liquidity policy and conducting liquidity policy independent of the QR peg was in fact, a highly successful QCB experience that was widely recognized (IMF 2009 (IMF , 2010 .
The interest rate differential between the QCB and the US Fed policy rates was expected to remain safe until well into 2011. Disinflation provided a silver lining for Qatar, presenting an opportunity that QCB should not have missed in order to discipline the QR real exchange rate as a requisite to preserve the relative national wealth and relative size of the economy within the unified GCC currency area (among other policy goals).
Concluding Remarks
This paper considers the phenomenon of structural PLS over the last decade of QCB's liquidity management. The paper defines structural PLS in view of practical central banking, identifies various sources of PLS in the context of the Qatari economy, and its consequences for the QCB monetary policy transmission mechanism and for the economy at large. The paper discusses the causes of QCB's unsuccessful experience over the years preceding the crisis and those of its highly successful experience in managing interbank liquidity over the crisis years. The effectiveness of the QR hard peg is identified as the major cause in the first case and its ineffectiveness is identified as the major cause in the second case. Our main conclusions can be summarized as follows:
• While the build-up of primary liquidity in the banking system during the pre-crisis years was mainly driven by surging capital inflows due to record hydrocarbon export revenues, FDI (including financial FDI) and speculative funds in expectation of QR appreciation during the pre-crisis years. The build-up was driven by the gradual implementation of a large scale state rescue package in support of the Qatari commercial banks during the post-crisis years.
• While the structural PLS was highly inflationary during the pre-crisis years (in an environment of over-heating economy), the surplus was not at all inflationary during the crisis period, due to negative shocks in the market for loanable funds, a shift in liquidity preference and re-pricing risks on behalf of banks (operating in an uncertain environment), and shocked demand on behalf of the non-bank private sector.
• While QCB's capacity to drain liquidity off the interbank market was minimal over the pre-crisis period because QCB was short on monetary tools and lacked government coordination, QCB's liquidity draining capacity rose significantly during the crisis period due to significantly greater government coordination and the augmentation of its arsenal with new monetary tools.
• While the QCB failed to control inflation during the pre-crisis years, it had contributed successfully to deflating the economy during the post-crisis years.
• The effectiveness of the interest rate channel of the monetary transmission mechanism was dramatically improved due to the change in the QCB monetary policy framework. • QCB can alter the QR exchange rate arrangement by widening the margins around the central parity (better still, it can adopt a more flexible exchange rate regime), in which case QCB can have the policy interest rate instrumented for domestic policy goals, while have QCB interventions instrumented for stabilizing the exchange rate. This pact would render the exchange rate more instrumental for addressing exogenous shocks.
25 Qatar Vision 2030, General Secretariat for Development Planning, Qatar.
Appendix: A Test of Uncovered Interest Rate Parity in Qatar
The general specification of uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) is given as,
where (s t+n − s t ) e is the expected change of the logarithm of the exchange rate (s t is the logarithm of the spot exchange rate in units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency);
is the interest rate differential relative to the foreign country and rp is the risk premium.
For simplicity, we make the weak assumption that the expected rate of change in the domestic currency is stationary. We also assume the risk premium to be stationary, which is a reflection of Qatar's relative economic stability and low political risk observed in the past decade. The (indirect) test of UIP can be expressed as:
where ε t is a stationary disturbance term encompassing the expected rate of change of the domestic currency and the risk premium. Under the null hypothesis of UIP, the intercept estimate should be zero and the slope estimate should be one (i.e., α = 0 and β = 1). The data span from July 2004 to December 2011 and is dubbed the "full" sample, which is further divided into two sub-samples: the "pre-crisis" period (July 2004 to September 2008) and the "crisis" period (October 2008 to December 2011). The interest rates used in this analysis are the annualized three-month deposit interest rate in Qatar and the three-month eurodollar deposit rate (London), which is a more relevant foreign interest rate from Qatar's perspective due to geographical proximity as well as financial and trade integration with Europe.
As a first step, we tested for the order of integration of the two interest rates. The augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test statistics suggest that both interest rates have a unit root, while their first differences are stationary across the three sample periods (i.e., pre-crisis, crisis and full sample). Results are not affected by the choice of the deterministic component (i.e., the intercept and linear trend) in the test regression. We base our inference on the 5% level of significance.
Given the finding of nonstationarity interest rates, we then tested for bivariate cointegration between the two interest rates using the well-known Johansen cointegration approach. The results show no evidence of cointegration between the two interest rates over the pre-crisis sample. The null of one cointegrating relationship cannot be rejected over the crisis sample. 26
However, this finding is sensitive to the choice of lag length and the type of deterministic component considered in the test regression. Moreover, over the full sample, the null of no cointegration cannot be rejected at the 5% level, suggesting the non-existence of a long run equilibrium relationship between domestic and foreign interest rates. Overall, the absence or lack of a bivariate cointegration between the domestic and foreign interest rates can be interpreted as an empirical failure of the UIP.
In the final step of our empirical analysis, we tested for the joint hypotheses (i.e., α = 0 and β = 1) using the Wald test based on the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of equation (2). The results show that for the three sample periods, the F-statistics strongly reject the null hypothesis of joint restrictions. We have also examined the normality assumption of the OLS regression errors and are unable to reject the null hypothesis of normality in all three sample periods. Finally, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test indicates no evidence of serial correlation in the regression errors. Nevertheless, in the light of our findings (i.e., non-stationarity and non-cointegration), these results should be carefully interpreted. These unreported results are available from the corresponding author on request.
26 However, we observe that both post-crisis LIBOR and the FFR stabilized at a very low rate, while the QIBOR stabilized at a relatively very high rate (see Figure 2 ). 
